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 Executive Summary 
 
United States policymakers are concerned with mercury emissions because 
mercury has potentially adverse effects on children whose mothers consumed 
contaminated fish while pregnant. Congress and the Environmental Protection Agency 
are considering different proposals to cut or even eliminate mercury emissions from oil 
and coal-fired power plants.  
 
We compare the cost of cutting power plants' mercury emissions with the likely 
reductions in the number of cases of subtle neurological effects.  Given current scientific 
understanding, the health and environmental improvements are very unlikely to provide 
an economic justification for the costs of stringent controls on mercury emissions.  In 
addition, if Congress or EPA were to regulate mercury emissions from power plants, an 
approach that used prices would be more efficient than one that limited the quantity of 
mercury emissions.    1
Regulating Mercury Emissions: 
What Do We Know About Costs and Benefits? 
 





Mercury in the environment has provoked substantial concern among U.S. 
policymakers.
1 An organic form, methylmercury (MeHg), accumulates in higher 
concentrations as it moves up the food chain, and prenatal exposure to low doses from 
maternal consumption of fish has been associated with subtle neurological deficiencies in 
children.
2 To reduce human exposure, states have issued more than 1,900 fish 
consumption advisories covering nearly the entire East Coast, the Gulf of Mexico, and 
the Great Lakes.
3  
Further government action is likely. Several bills in Congress would require 
utilities to reduce their mercury emissions by 90 percent.
4 During the election campaign, 
then-Governor Bush expressed support for the ideas behind these bills.
5 The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which regulates mercury emissions from 
municipal waste combustors and medical waste incinerators, determined in December 
2000 that regulating emissions from coal and oil burning utilities under the Clean Air Act 
(CAA) is “appropriate and necessary”.
6 Its decision will lead to a regulation by December 
2004, requiring plants to adopt the “maximum achievable control technology” (MACT), 
a standard likely to lead to stringent emissions reductions.
7  
 Regulating mercury emissions from power plants entails a tradeoff. More 
stringent mercury emissions limits may reduce mercury contamination of fish, thereby 
                                                        
1 See Renner (1999) for discussion of federal agencies’ consideration of health effects of mercury exposure. 
2 See National Research Council (2000). 
3 Each advisory addresses specific species or size of fish from certain bodies of water. The list of states 
excludes Delaware, Maryland and Ohio. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1999b). 
4 The Clean Power Plant and Modernization Act of 1999 (S 1949) sponsored by Senator Leahy would 
require the removal of 90% of the mercury otherwise present in the fuel. The Clean Smokestacks Act of 
1999 (HR 2900) sponsored by Congressman Waxman would cut emissions to 10 percent of 1997 
emissions. Senator Leahy and Congressman Waxman’s staff inform us that these bills will be reintroduced. 
For a discussion of emissions reductions options, see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1999a).  
5 See Bush (2000). 
6 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2000).   
7 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2000) and the Clean Air Act, at 42 U.S.C. Section 7412.   2
lowering the risks of adverse health effects. On the other hand, controlling mercury 
emissions entails costs that utilities will pass on to customers.  
 While assessing this tradeoff is difficult because of limitations to scientific 
understanding, Lutter and Mader suggest that eliminating mercury emissions from U.S. 
power plants could reduce the numbers of U.S. children experiencing subtle neurological 
deficiencies by on the order of 10,000 per year.
8 We use this estimate as a point of 
departure and assess the costs and benefits of mercury emissions controls. 
  We show that the costs of reducing mercury emissions from power plants are 
likely to substantially outweigh the benefits. We also show that the quantity restrictions 
in Congressional proposals and in EPA’s regulatory effort are unlikely to be as efficient 
as an alternative approach that reduces the risk of high compliance costs.  
 The next section deals with public health and environmental benefits of reducing 
mercury emissions from power plants. The subsequent sections address the cost and cost-
effectiveness of emissions cuts, the general limitations of current understanding, policy 
design, and conclusions. 
 
2. Public Health and Environmental Benefits of Controlling Environmental 
Mercury  
We focus on human health effects associated with consumption of mercury- 
contaminated fish because benefits to wildlife appear to be quite small. Such benefits are 
concentrated in species whose diet is mostly fish because methylmercury tends to 
accumulate in fish tissue.
 9 In its multi-volume report to Congress in 1997, EPA described 
environmental effects by noting only that environmental mercury may adversely affect 
reproduction of loons. But common loon populations have been rising for several 
decades. The annual growth rate of the common loon population was 2.6 percent between 
                                                        
8 See Lutter and Mader (2001). 
9 See U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (1997, Vol. VII, Chapter 3). Although mercury is also a 
threat to the endangered Florida panthers, the State of Florida lists it as less important than the loss, 
fragmentation and degradation of habitat, inbreeding of panthers, lack of large prey, and disease. See 
Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (2000). Panthers, because they are top of the food 
chain predators, suffer from contaminants other than mercury, such as polychlorinated biphenyls and 
pesticides; see U.S. Geological Survey (1999). Mercury in the Everglades comes from Europe and Asia as 
well as North America; see Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (2000) and also U.S. 
Geological Survey (2000a and 2000b). Thus, reductions in U.S. mercury emissions may have very small 
effects on levels of mercury in South Florida, which is anyway low in the list of threats facing panthers.    3
1966 and 1999, with a 95 percent confidence interval from 1.6 to 3.7 percent.
10 
Populations of other fish-eating birds have been growing at even faster rates.
11 These 
high growth rates and the fact there appears to be no correlation between areas of low 
population growth and areas of high mercury deposition suggest that the ecological 
benefits of reducing mercury emissions are likely to be negligible.
12 
Lutter and Mader recently estimated that as many as 180,000 U.S. children per 
year were likely to experience neurological deficiencies from exposure to mercury but 
that the vast majority of these deficiencies would be quite small compared to variations 
found within normal populations.
13 Their estimates are different from those recently 
reported in the Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Review, in that Lutter and Mader 
assessed both exposure and the likely severity of health effects (using available 
epidemiological relationships).
14  Lutter and Mader found that all of the effects are 
relatively small percentages of a standard deviation (see table). In addition, they found 
that, because other factors contribute to exposure, eliminating mercury emissions from 
U.S. power plants would avoid only about 5 percent of these cases per year.
15  
The Lutter and Mader assessment may overestimate public health improvements 
if recent government advisories reduce excessive fish consumption among people who 
are highly exposed to mercury. The Food and Drug Administration just released a new 
advisory recommending that, to avoid levels of mercury that could harm an unborn child, 
pregnant women should not eat any shark, swordfish, king mackerel or tilefish and 
should limit their consumption of cooked fish to twelve ounces per week on average.
 16 
EPA released a similar directive to reduce consumption of wild-caught freshwater fish. It 
                                                        
10 See Sauer et al. (2000). 
11 For osprey populations the survey-wide trend is 6.7 percent (with a 95 percent confidence interval of 4.8 
percent to 8.6 percent) while for double-crested cormorants the survey-wide trend is 7 percent per annum 
(and the 95 percent confidence interval is from 2.4 percent to 11.6 percent). See Sauer et al. (2000). 
12 See the trend maps in Sauer et al. (2000). 
13 Lutter and Mader (2001) also consider the possibility of cardiovascular effects of mercury-contaminated 
fish, as suggested by Salonen et al. (1995), but conclude that the lack of replication of those results and the 
contrary results of the Kinjo study (1996) make it inappropriate to include cardiovascular benefits of 
mercury reduction without further research into the existence of such an effect. 
14 See Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (2001).  
15 This assessment of the benefits of reducing U.S. mercury emissions neglects effects on non-U.S. 
populations although cuts in U.S. mercury emissions may improve the health of children in other countries 
whose mothers consume large quantities of fish. Assessing the magnitude and significance of any health 
improvements in these populations is beyond the scope of this project. 
16 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration (2001c).   4
says, “If you are pregnant or could become pregnant, are nursing a baby, or if you are 
feeding a young child, limit consumption of fish caught by family and friends to one meal 
per week. For adults one meal is six ounces of cooked fish or eight ounces uncooked fish; 
for a young child one meal is two ounces cooked fish or three ounces uncooked fish.”
17 
These advisories will lower the benefits of reducing emissions to the extent that they 
lower the number of pregnant women whose diets expose them to high levels of mercury.  
  
3. Costs of Controlling Mercury Emissions 
According to EPA, the costs of stringent regulation of mercury emissions are 
likely to be between $1.1 billion per year and $1.7 billion per year.
18 The emissions 
reductions from mercury specific controls and pre-existing controls are between 60 to 95 
percent for the lower cost estimate and between 80 to 95 percent for the upper cost 
estimate.
19 These estimates reflect use of a composite sorbent (lime and powdered 
activated carbon) that was tested in only a small number of pilot scale systems and are 
fairly uncertain. EPA predicts that costs would rise by about 40 percent if estimates were 
based on a technology supported by data from a larger number of trials of pilot scale 
systems.
20  
A key question in evaluating cost is the effectiveness of mercury emission 
controls in reducing other forms of pollution. In its recent determination, EPA reaches no 
conclusion about whether mercury emission controls reduce emissions of nitrogen oxides 
and sulfur dioxide.
21 EPA had previously found that mercury controls on utility emissions 
are likely to have “little effect” on sulfur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen,
22 and we adopt 
that view here.
23  
                                                        
17 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2001). 
18 See Jayarman et al. (2000). These are 1999 dollars.  
19 See Jayarman et al. (2000, p. 7). EPA apparently gives no estimate of how much of these mercury 
emissions reductions result from adoption of the new mercury-specific control measures. One memo 
indicates, however, that in 1999 air pollution control devices currently installed on existing units captured 
43 percent of the mercury in fuels. See Princiotta (2000, p.6). 
20 See Jayarman et al. (2000). 
21 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2000). 
22 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1999a, 4-2). 
23 The effect may depend in part on the stringency of controls for sulfur-dioxide and nitrogen oxides, 
something that may vary with ongoing court battles and future regulations.  
   5
 The cost-effectiveness of controls on coal-fired utilities may be quite poor 
compared to controls to reduce mercury emissions from other sources. The best measure 
of cost-effectiveness￿the incremental social cost for the last unit of environmental and 
public health damage from mercury￿is not available. EPA’s estimates suggest, however, 
that the cost per pound of mercury emissions removed at coal-fired power plants is more 
than 75 times the cost per pound of a recent regulation of emissions from municipal 
waste combustors
24 and about 17 times the cost per pound of regulating medical waste 
incinerator emissions.
25 These comparisons are imperfect because 1) they neglect 
reductions in other contaminants, likely to be smaller for power plant controls;
26 2) they 
are based on average rather than incremental cost; and 3) the data on utility control costs 
may be slightly higher than more recent estimates. Nonetheless, the cost of mercury 
controls for utilities appears much greater than the cost of controls for other sources. 
 
4. Comparison of Health Benefits and Costs  
It is difficult to compare the reductions in risk described earlier with the costs of 
regulating mercury. Such comparisons typically require assessment of the value of health 
benefits using measures of willingness to pay to avert risks. Yet small changes in finger 
tapping skills, hand-eye coordination, and the ability to recall names￿changes found in 
affected individuals￿are such specific and relatively minor health effects that the 
economics literature has not developed estimates of willingness to pay. The McCarthy 
generalized cognitive index is a broad measure of neurological performance that may be 
more amenable to economic valuation, but it was not statistically significantly associated 
with mercury in one series of studies.
27 Moreover, this index is not equivalent to I.Q., a 
measure of neurological performance with clear and measurable economic implications.
28  
                                                        
24 See Table 5 for a full explanation.  
25 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1997, Vol. VIII, p. ES-14). These cost-effectiveness 
estimates assume that the entire cost of control is attributed to mercury removal; see p. ES-13.  
26 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1999a, 4-2). 
27 See Davidson et al. (1998). See also Myers et al. (2000). 
28 McCarthy reported correlation coefficients of only 0.71 between the McCarthy Scale’s generalized 
cognitive index and the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence, a full-scale measure of IQ; 
See Massoth (1985, p.10) describing McCarthy. Nagle (1979, p. 319) reports that the McCarthy Scales’ 
concurrent validity with conventional IQ tests suggests that the McCarthy generalized cognitive index and 
IQ are not compatible. In studies of learning disabled, mentally retarded, and gifted children, the McCarthy   6
While the health gains from eliminating mercury emissions from power plants are 
difficult to value in dollar terms, subjectively they appear much smaller than EPA’s 
estimates of $1.1 billion to $1.7 billion per year for the costs of unspecified cuts in 
emissions. Regulatory costs of about $1.5 billion per year might result in improvements 
in the health of around 10,000 children, given Lutter and Mader’s assumption that the 
elimination of mercury emissions from power plants would cut elevated exposure in the 
United States by only 5 percent.
29 In this case, whether the health benefits justify the 
costs amounts to whether a family would prefer a payment of $150,000 to receiving these 
health improvements.
30 The size of the health improvements in question suggests a clear 
answer. As shown in the table, the middle exposure group would experience gains in 
naming skills and reaction times of about 11 percent and 14 percent of a standard 
deviation, respectively. Improvements in other aspects of neurological performance 
would be smaller, except for the small group of children initially exposed to levels 
greater than 4 ppm. Yet all these changes in neurological performance are within the 
range of normal outcomes, which typically encompasses four standard deviations. As a 
result, the health improvements would be hard to discern without a formal evaluation. 
Therefore, we believe that the vast majority of all families would view such health effects 
as much less valuable than $150,000.  
 
5. General Limitations  
Before jumping to a discussion of policy, we briefly review general limitations of 
this analysis. First, we have ignored any behavioral response, although for nearly thirty 
years economists have recognized that people protect themselves from risks and that 
changes in such self-protection can alter the effectiveness of regulatory efforts to control 
risks.
31 In the case of mercury, if anglers decide to eat more fish after a program of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
scale underestimated IQs by an average of 8 to 20 points. For further discussion of the correlation between 
the McCarthy Scales and IQ, see also Massoth (1985, pp. 10-11) and Davis (1975, pp. 102-104). 
29 Five percent of the sum of the population estimates in table 2 is 7,000 for the low estimate and 9,000 for 
the high estimate. This calculation understates the cost per case avoided because it uses cost estimates that 
reflect only a partial cut in emissions and health improvements consistent with a total elimination of 
emissions.  
30 In fact, this thought experiment is simplified. Families should more accurately be asked to choose 
between a modest payment and a very small reduction in risk of minor health effects. 
31 See Ehrlich and Becker (1972) and more recently Shogren and Crocker (1999).   7
emissions reductions is in place, their total exposure may not be reduced as much as 
estimated here and could even be unaffected by the emissions cuts.  
Yet a recent EPA decision illustrates how government actions might change 
behavior so as to increase risks. In a decision based “solely on data and scientific 
judgments about the relationship between pollutant concentrations and environmental and 
human health effects”, EPA set a stringent water quality criterion for methylmercury that 
can be interpreted to mean that much of the current fish supply is not safe.
32 EPA’s 
criteria level “to protect consumers of fish and shellfish among the general population”
33 
is 30 percent of the Food and Drug Administration’s “action limit” of 1 ppm.
34 
Approximately a third of all edible fish found in U.S. waters have methylmercury 
concentrations in excess of the criteria level set by EPA.
35 In addition, the mean 
concentrations of mercury for several species and the maximum concentrations for nearly 
all species exceed the criteria value.
36 Since EPA believes that ambient water quality 
criteria are “numeric values considered to be protective of public health for pollutant 
concentrations in aquatic media,”
37 its action suggests that mercury concentrations in a 
substantial portion of fish consumed by U.S. residents may not be safe. Consumers may 
well react to this news by reducing fish consumption even though this could increase 
their health risks, especially for groups such as women beyond child-bearing age.
38 While 
the net effect of EPA’s action on risk is an empirical question, the net benefits of cutting 
mercury emissions will be lowered to the extent that the public reduces its fish 
consumption.  We ignore such behavioral changes because they are hard to forecast. 
Second, we ignore distributional effects. While these are hard to assess, 
controlling mercury emissions from power plants may redistribute resources away from 
the poor because they are thought to be disproportionately affected by increases in energy 
costs. No conclusions about the distribution of net benefits by income level are possible, 
                                                        
32 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2001b, p. 1345). 
33 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2001b, p. 1344). 
34 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration (1998). 
35 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1999, Table 4-2).  
36 EPA does not report other points in the distribution. Species with mean values above EPA’s criteria value 
are porgy, shark, and swordfish. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2001a, p. 5-28). For 
maximum reported concentrations, see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1997, p. 4-63, Vol. IV).  
37 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2001b, p. 1345). 
38 See Egeland et al. (1997).   8
however, because virtually nothing is known about the socioeconomic status of women 
who are highly exposed to mercury.  
6. Policy Design  
 The legislative and regulatory initiatives issued to date are unlikely to lead to 
efficient mercury regulation for several general reasons. First, they all appear to be too 
stringent. Only very modest mercury controls would appear to make economic sense.  
Second, the proposals would regulate the quantity of emissions, rather than the 
price, even though Weitzman’s seminal insights suggest that quantity controls are inferior 
in this instance.
39 Weitzman assessed which class of policy instruments would generally 
provide higher expected social benefits when control costs are uncertain. He indicated 
that a price control (that is, an effluent charge) would have higher expected net social 
benefits if the marginal benefits curve were flatter than the marginal cost curve.  
For mercury, the marginal benefits curve is likely to be very flat throughout the 
entire range of mercury emissions from utilities because such emissions contribute to 
only a small part of total exposure. Thus, even the elimination of mercury emissions from 
U.S. utilities would reduce human exposure by only 5 percent, as discussed above. 
Marginal control costs, on the other hand, are likely to rise very steeply over the interval 
of proposed emission reductions.
40 To limit the risk of unexpectedly high compliance 
costs, the efficient policy instrument would be a price-based one that limits cost increases 
and does not stipulate a specific, numerical emissions limit. Of course, hybrid policies are 
also possible.
41 Under a hybrid approach, the government would require that utilities have 
permits to emit mercury, allow utilities to trade permits, and also offer to supply 
unlimited permits at a given price that effectively caps economic costs. The legislative 
proposals, by focusing only on the quantity of emissions, do not control the risk of high 
compliance costs and so are less efficient than an alternative approach based on effluent 
charges. 
 Third, the recent legislative proposals are unlikely to ensure that mercury controls 
from all sources are cost-effective￿that is, the marginal cost of avoiding environmental 
                                                        
39 See Weitzman, M. L. (1974). 
40 This argument is very similar to one advanced by William Pizer in the context of climate change. See 
Pizer (1997). 
41 See Weitzman (1978) and Roberts and Spence (1976).    9
damages from mercury is equalized among different sources￿because they cover only 
one of the several sources of mercury that are regulated. Lutter and Mader estimate that 
power plants in the United States will account for only 21 percent of mercury deposited 
in the United States by 2006.
42 This percentage is much less than the 70 percent of total 
emissions covered by EPA’s sulfur dioxide permit trading program.
43 A cost-effective 
approach would entail equivalent emission limits or effluent charges in multiple sectors.  
 In addition to these general shortcomings, EPA’s recent determination that 
regulation of mercury emissions from coal- and oil-fired electric utility steam generating 
units is “appropriate and necessary”
44 is unlikely to lead to efficient regulation for more 
specific reasons. First, EPA has invoked a section of the Clean Air Act that pays little 
attention to economics. Section 112(c) of the Clean Air Act directs EPA to establish 
emission standards equal to the maximum achievable control technology (MACT),
45 and 
the agency may not consider the benefits or the costs of more or less stringent standards 
when it develops its regulation. Second, EPA has applied the section in a manner that 
covers oil-fired plants as well as coal-fired plants, although oil-fired plants’ mercury 
emissions will be approximately 0.2 percent of total power plant emissions.
46 Third, EPA 
will likely be unable to allow plants to trade emissions permits under the projected 
MACT standards; at least, no MACT regulation to date allows permit trading. Thus, 
EPA’s regulation will not be economically sensible. Moreover, the ultimate status of 
EPA’s regulation is in doubt because the Edison Electric Institute filed a petition with the 
court of appeals seeking a review of EPA’s determination; in addition, the Utility Air 
Regulatory Group plans to file a petition with EPA asking the agency to reconsider its 
determination of December 2000.
47  
 The legislative proposals and EPA’s recent regulatory determination all seem to 
neglect established principles for economically sound regulation, although the 
Environmental Council of States has recently advocated scientifically sound, cost-
                                                        
42 See Lutter and Mader (2001, Appendix). 
43 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1993, p. 3590). 
44 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2000).  
45 Existing law defines MACT to be a technology capable of meeting emission levels achieved by the 
average of the best-performing 12 percent of sources. EPA may choose the pool of sources over which to 
define this average; See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2000). 
46 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2000, p. 79,828). 
47 See Cook, 2001.  10
effective and flexible mercury reduction programs.
48 Instead of regulating so as to 
maximize net benefits￿a principle articulated in executive orders on regulation signed 
by Presidents Reagan and Clinton
49￿these initiatives seem to adhere to a view that 
bioaccumulative, persistent toxics should be stringently regulated regardless of costs and 
benefits. Yet these labels merely point to pertinent analytic issues; they do not invalidate 
economic principles. The bioaccumulative nature of methylmercury means that its effects 
are most likely to appear at the top of the food chain. Persistence means that damages 
relate to the stock of past emissions or that ecological systems are slow to recover; yet 
because concentrations in various media are not rising and natural processes assimilate 
some mercury through burial in sediment and volatilization, the extent of persistence is 
best seen as an empirical question.
50 Finally, toxic health effects can be incorporated into 
a benefits analysis by considering these effects to be a risk that people strive to avoid. 
There is nothing about mercury that prevents an economically sound evaluation of 
alternative emission control policies.  
Finally, international agreements to control mercury emissions may be 
appropriate because mercury pollution crosses international boundaries. Yet the effect of 
deep unilateral cuts in mercury emissions on the development of sensible international 
agreements on mercury emissions control policies is unclear. The United States and 
Canada agreed on a strategy for the virtual elimination of persistent toxic substances, 
including mercury, from the Great Lakes, without the United States having unilaterally 
adopted deep emissions cuts in advance.
51 The strategy is credited with spurring the 
development of a variety of control measures in the Great Lakes area. The United States 
may promote the development of economically sensible emission control measures in 
other countries as much by adopting relatively lax controls as by adopting stringent ones 
with costs disproportionately larger than expected benefits.  
                                                        
48 See Environmental Council of States (2001). 
49 Presidential Executive Orders 12291 and 12866; see Reagan (1981) and Clinton (1993), respectively. 
50 EPA reports that mercury concentrations in mussels at a sample of 154 sites were unchanged in the 
period from 1986 to 1993. See EPA (2001a, p. 5-27). EPA notes “there are no clear temporal trends in 
tissue mercury concentrations in fish and shellfish over the past two decades.” See EPA (2001a, p. 5-46). 
Poissant et al. (2000) reported that water-air exchanges contributed to atmospheric mercury buildup over 
water bodies.  
51 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1999c).  11
7. Conclusions 
 
Given current scientific understanding, the health and environmental benefits are 
very unlikely to provide an economic justification for the costs of stringent controls on 
mercury emissions. Available data suggest that cutting power plants’ mercury emissions 
may reduce cases of subtle and mostly imperceptible neurological effects among children 
at a cost on the order of $150,000 per case avoided. Other health and environmental 
benefits appear negligible.  
Current legislative and regulatory proposals also ignore the fact that effluent 
charges may be economically preferable to quantity restrictions for mercury reduction.  A 
modest charge for mercury emissions or for coal combustion emitting mercury may make 




Mercury-Related Declines as a Percent of the Standard Deviation 






Level Of Exposure  
 
1 ppm to 2 ppm  2 ppm to 4 ppm  > 4 ppm 
Average Exposure Within 
Exposure Category   1.5 ppm  2.8 ppm  5.4 ppm 
Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Reductions in Children Exposed 
 By Exposure Level  5,000  6,000  1,200  1,500  300  1,500 
Finger Tapping
  3.9  9.9  16 
Hand-Eye Coordination
  3.2  8.1  13 
Reaction Time
  5.3  14  22 
Boston Naming Test
  4.1  11  17 
Long-Delay Recall of 12 Words
  3.2  8.4  14 
McCarthy’s Perceptual 
Performance Scale (when one 
child is excluded)
  1.6  5.8  14 
 
Note that the reductions in children exposed are based on Lutter and Mader’s assumption 
that eliminating mercury emissions from U.S. power plants would reduce the number of 
highly exposed U.S. residents by 5 percent. See Lutter and Mader (2001).   13
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